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tables reporting school performance across a number of indicators. This paper reports the results of an 
interview-based study, showing that head teachers care about their school’s place in the league tables, 
and that they believe this system affects behaviour. The effects they identify include some unintended 
consequences, not necessarily related to improved overall school performance, including focusing on 
borderline students who can boost a pivotal indicator: the number of students gaining five A*-Cs at 
GCSE. This behaviour reflects, in part, the dual role played by headteachers: they are both 
educationalists (serving the interests of all pupils); and school marketers, concerned with promoting the 
school to existing and prospective parents. The behaviour is also consistent with economic theory, 
which predicts a focus on that which is measured, potentially at the expense of that which is important, 
in sectors characterised by incomplete measurement, by multiple stakeholders and containing workers 
with diverse objectives. We conclude that, given that performance indicators do affect behaviour, it is 
important to minimise unintended consequences, and we suggest the use of value-added indicators of 
student performance.  
 
Keywords: education, performance measures 
 
JEL Classification: I2 
 
Acknowledgements   
Thanks to the Leverhulme Trust for funding this work through the Leverhulme Centre for Market and 
Public Organisation, and to Simon Burgess, Carol Propper and Marisa Ratto for comments on previous 
drafts. Particular thanks to our respondents for agreeing to take part in this study. The views expressed 
in this paper are our own. 
 
Address for Correspondence 
Deborah Wilson 
CMPO 
School of Economics, Finance and Management 
University of Bristol 
12 Priory Road 






Performance management in government has received increasing interest since the 
‘re-inventing government’ movement of the late 1980s (Osbourne and Gaebler 1992). 
In the US, performance measures have been employed in many federal and state 
programmes dealing with, for example, job training, welfare to work, and child 
support enforcement, as well as in the health care sector (Marshall et al 2000), while 
the No Child Left Behind Act put the use of such accountability systems based on 
student test performance into federal law in January 2002. In the UK, the Financial 
Management Initiative, introduced in the early 1980s, embodied performance 
management but was assessed as being unsuccessful in influencing public sector 
resource allocation or in increasing the degree of public sector accountability 
(Osbourne et al 1995; Sharifi and Bovaird 1995). The use of performance measures 
has increased through the previous Conservative and current Labour administrations. 
Performance targets, their publication, and the linking of such targets to the resources 
allocated by Treasury to government departments is now widespread in the UK public 
sector. In addition, individual providers of public services now may get specific 
rewards linked to their performance, either directly  – the top performing hospitals 
gain ‘earned autonomy’, for example; or indirectly – schools that perform well attract 
more students and hence more resources. 
 
The public sector has specific features which complicate the causal link between the 
measurement of performance and its improvement (Behn 2003). First, bureaucrats 
often serve multiple stakeholders, including service users, taxpayers and politicians 
(Dixit 2002). Second, partly a consequence of the first, public sector agencies often 
have to work towards several goals, some of which may be in conflict, and each of 
which may be complex and/or difficult to define. The multiple and sometimes vague 
goals of the public sector mean that performance relative to these goals is difficult to 
measure. At best, a performance measurement system will provide an imperfect 
picture of a complex process, which leaves scope for the performance measure to be 
‘gamed’, i.e. it leaves scope for unintended responses (Smith 1995). 
 
A third feature is that public sector workers may exhibit ‘public sector’ or ‘intrinsic’ 
motivation, which may cause them to respond in particular ways to the incentives 
embodied in a performance measurement system. Intrinsic motivation has been 
defined as occurring when an individual is “motivated to perform an activity when 
[he/she] receives no apparent reward except the activity itself” (Deci 1971, page 105, 
cited in Jones and Cullis 2003). Crewson (1997) distinguishes intrinsic rewards from 
extrinsic rewards (such as a pay rises or promotion). The distinction matters since it 
may affect the impact of rewards on behaviour. Extrinsic rewards may not work: they 
may ‘crowd out’ workers’ intrinsic motivation and so have a negative impact on 
public sector performance (Frey 2000). 
 
Le Grand (2003) argues that the move towards more market based systems of public 
service delivery, often incorporating performance measurement, represents a change 
in belief regarding motivation. Specifically, he argues that there has been a shift from 
believing public sector workers are ‘knights’, i.e. predominantly public spirited or 
                                                 
1 According to Behn (2003, page 599), “what gets measured gets done” is perhaps the most famous 
aphorism of performance measurement. 3 
altruistic, to thinking of them as ‘knaves’, i.e. motivated primarily by their own self 
interest. Le Grand argues that public sector incentive structures should be robust, in 
the sense that they should not rely on any particular assumption regarding motivation, 
but should appeal to both ‘knight’ and ‘knave’. In this way, provider incentives may 
be aligned in such a way as to help achieve the objectives of both service user and 
government as two key stakeholders. 
 
This paper investigates the extent to which the performance management system 
currently employed in the English secondary school  sector aligns schools’ and 
stakeholders’ objectives. In the English education sector, parents are active agents 
(‘queens’ rather than ‘pawns’ in Le Grand’s terminology), who are able to choose to 
which school they would prefer to send their child. Headteachers are also active, since 
parental choice between schools is informed by the annual publication of school 
performance tables, giving headteachers an incentive to improve (at least measured) 
performance in order to attract more students. We consider both the impact of what 
has become the key target performance indicator  – the percentage of a school’s 
students gaining at least five GCSE passes at grade C or above (%5A*-C) – and the 
recently introduced value-added performance measures (PMs). 
 
In the study reported in this paper we analyse headteachers’ perceptions of the 
incentives created by  these alternative summary PMs. Our analysis is based on 21 
semi-structured telephone interviews with headteachers of secondary schools in 
England, conducted between December 2002 and May 2003. This coincided with the 
publication of the first value-added performance measures, in January 2003, as part of 
the 2002 secondary school league tables
2. The interviews formed part of a wider 
project on the introduction of performance related pay for teachers (Burgess and 
Croxson 2001). Here, we report the results from one section of the interview, in which 
we asked our respondents questions on three related topics: (a) how they viewed the 
current league tables and their perceptions of other stakeholders’ views; (b) their 
responses to the key target indicator, %5A*-C; and (c) the likely impact of the new 
value-added performance measure. 
 
We find that headteachers perceive parents as active users in the English education 
quasi-market, and that they do respond to the competitive pressure created by parental 
choice. There is evidence of ‘knavish’ as well as ‘knightly’ responses, including 
strategies intended to boost the %5A*-C indicator, regardless of the impact on overall 
student performance. While the introduction of a value-added PM was cautiously 
welcomed as a more accurate basis for measuring student progress and hence school 
performance, the majority of respondents did not expect it to lead to a change in their 
behaviour, primarily due to the current dominance of the %5A*-C measure. On the 
basis of these findings, we suggest ways in which the school performance tables may 
be altered so that organisational incentives are better aligned to both headteacher 
motivation and stakeholder objectives. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe and 
discuss the use of performance measures in the education sector, culminating in four 
specific hypotheses regarding how we might expect headteachers to respond to the 
English secondary school performance tables. We briefly outline our methodology 
                                                 
2 http://www.dfes.gov.uk/performancetables/index.shtml  4 
and describe our sample in Section 3, before reporting our findings in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2 Performance measures in the English education sector 
 
The education sector in England has been subject to relatively high levels of public 
monitoring since the implementation of the 1988 Education Reform Act and the 
creation of the education quasi-market. The reforms introduced open enrolment, 
overlapping catchment areas and devolved budgets based on per capita funding, with 
money following students. Parental choice is informed by two forms of publicly 
available performance measures: Ofsted reports; and the annual publication of 
summary PMs in school performance tables, commonly referred to as the league 
tables. Here, we focus on the latter. In this system, schools face an implicit financial 
incentive to improve their performance, if by doing so they attract more students and 
hence more funding
3. Le Grand (2003) argues that this incentive structure is robust to 
both ‘knavish’ and ‘knightly’ motivations. Headteachers are the relevant decision 
makers and have the incentive to maintain the financial health of the school, either 
through a self interested desire to keep their own jobs, or through the more altruistic 
aim of creating a greater surplus with which to provide better services for students. As 
we will show, the design of the performance measurement system affects the precise 
balance between such motivations, as well as how they are manifest in headteachers’ 
behaviour. 
 
The performance management system in the English education sector uses three types 
of summary PM to try and capture movement towards the goal of improving student 
performance (Kane and Staiger 2002). Levels are the raw output scores of a cohort of 
students at a specific point in time, often reported as the percentage of that cohort 
achieving a particular target. One key PM in England, for example, is the percentage 
of a school’s students who gain at least five GCSE passes or equivalent at grade C or 
above (%5A*-C)
4. Changes aim to capture the improvement of successive cohorts at 
the same grade in the same school across time (such as the improvement measures 
currently published in England), while gains provide a measure of the progress of one 
cohort between two points in time. The value-added PMs, published for the first time 
in the 2002 English school performance tables, provide an example of a gain PM. The 
aim of using a value-added PM is to better isolate the impact school environment has 
on student progress between two points in time. It does this by incorporating prior 
attainment, which helps to account for factors beyond the school’s control, such as 
family background and other personal characteristics.  
 
In the 2002 and 2003 English secondary school league tables the following PMs were 
published for each school: eight level PMs relating to GCSE exam scores and to Key 
Stage 3 test scores; two improvement or change measures; and indicators of student 
absence, both authorised and unauthorised. In addition, two value-added (gain) PMs 
                                                 
3 This contrasts with an explicit financial incentive scheme, in which a direct financial reward is made 
to the organisation or individuals within it – essentially pay for performance (Burgess et al 2002). 
4 The National Curriculum in England comprises four Key Stages. Pupils take tests in English, maths 
and science at the end of Key Stage 1, 2, and 3 (at ages 7, 11 and 14 respectively). The end of Key 
Stage 4 marks the end of compulsory schooling at age 16, at which point pupils take a range of exams 
known as GCSEs and GNVQs. 5 
were published for each secondary school: one provided an indicator of the average 
value-added by the school between the ages of 11 and 14 (Key Stage 2 to 3), and the 
other between the ages 14 and 16 (Key Stage 3 to 4)
5.  
 
The production of education is a complex process, so any one PM will at best be an 
imperfect measure of the multiple tasks undertaken by the school; indeed, some of 
these tasks may be inherently unmeasurable (Dixit 2002). One aim of publishing 
multiple PMs is to provide more information on this range of tasks. There is, however, 
a trade off between comprehensiveness and transparency: there is a danger that 
multiple indicators are unwieldy and hard for parents to evaluate. In practice, parents 
and other users often manage the complexity by focusing on one indicator – as has 
occurred in the English secondary education market where the headline PM has 
become the percentage of a school’s students gaining at least five GCSE passes at 
grade C or above (%5A*-C). 
 
Koretz (2002) identifies three problems with inferring educators’ performance from 
that of their students: the limitations of measures employed; the difficulties in drawing 
inferences regarding gains in student performance; and the perverse incentives that 
may be created. Propper and Wilson (2003) discuss the first two in some detail; here 
we focus on the last, the implications of alternative PMs for the responses elicited 
from schools, given that the aims of the government may not coincide with those of 
schools and headteachers (who may have ‘knavish’ as well as ‘knightly’ motivations). 
Different P Ms create different incentives for schools. As the government tries to 
improve student outcomes by implementing performance measurement, schools may 
respond with improved outcomes as well as other, unintended and less desired 
behaviour
6. Here we highlight three manifestations of such behaviour in the education 
context. 
 
The first follows from the fact that any summary PM is an incomplete measure of a 
complex process. This creates an incentive to concentrate on those parts of the process 
which are included in the summary measure, possibly to the detriment of other, less 
quantifiable, tasks. This type of behaviour includes, for example, the ‘teaching to the 
test’ strategies observed by Wiggins and Tymms (2002), D eere and Strayer (2001) 
and Jacob (2002). The second arises when a PM does not control for heterogeneity in 
the quality of the inputs.  This occurs if schools are able to achieve better relative 
positions in levels-based ranking exercises by virtue of having more able students, 
rather than because they necessarily deliver better quality education. A PM based on 
raw test scores therefore gives schools (and headteachers) an incentive to select those 
students most likely to improve its ranking. There is evidence of schools responding 
to such PMs by engaging in ‘creaming’ strategies, either when admitting students 
(Gerwitz et al 1995; Whitty et al 1998), or when deciding which types of student 
should take which tests (Figlio and Getzler 2002;  Times Educational Supplement 
2002). One way to reduce the incentive for such behaviour is for the PM to account 
directly for differences across the student population, an argument for the use of 
value-added measures of school performance.  
 
                                                 
5 Details on how the latter value-added PM is calculated are given in Wilson (2004). Performance 
tables for each school can be viewed at http://www.dfes.gov.uk/performancetables/index.shtml 
6 The possibility that the publication of summary PMs may cause public agencies to exhibit 
dysfunctional behaviour is well documented in Smith (1995). 6 
Finally, the design of PMs affects the incentives schools face when allocating 
resources across any given student population. As stated above, levels-based PMs are 
often reported in terms of the percentage of a school’s population attaining a specific 
target. They therefore focus schools’ attention on borderline students (Fitz-Gibbon 
and Tymms 2002), and create an incentive to shift their activities or to target their 
resources to students who might otherwise just miss the target. This may be to the 
detriment of the other students, and may or may not be welfare improving. Wiggins 
and Tymms (2002) and Deere and Strayer (2001) both provide evidence of such 
behaviour. A particular issue highlighted in the English secondary education sector is 
the incentive to focus on students who are perceived to be on the borderline between 
gaining a C and a D at GCSE  – so-called C/D borderline students. Additional 
resources targeted towards this group may boost a school’s ranking with respect to the 
%5A*-C indicator, but the impact on other students in the school is unclear (Mansell 
and Wright 2004).  
 
In summary, the production of education is a complex process, with multiple 
stakeholders including the government and parents. It is difficult  to capture the 
objectives of any one of these stakeholders using a set of summary PMs. 
Measurement difficulties are compounded if the objectives of stakeholders conflict 
with one another. But, as Behn (2003) argues, even good measurement is not enough: 
the aim of any performance measurement system is to improve performance. And here 
the role of the headteacher, and specifically his/her responses to the incentives created 
by the PMs employed, is central. The following quote from Schofield (2001, page 83) 
captures the complexity of the headteacher’s role:
7 
 
“As a consequence of policy initiatives, managers of [education] institutions 
have had to learn to become ‘business’ managers, entrepreneurial contractors 
with state purchasers and public strategists, all within an accountability system 
built around a managed market, but still with central state funding.” 
 
The motivation of headteachers determines how they respond to the incentives within 
the performance management system, while the design of the system determines the 
incentives created. In the English education system, the quasi-market provides an 
implicit financial incentive to improve (measured) performance, if parents respond by 
choosing to send their child to the school. There are also non-pecuniary rewards and 
penalties attached to the prestige associated with a good – or poor – league table 
position. 
 
So (how) do we expect headteachers to respond? Given the above discussion, we put 
forward the following hypotheses: 
 
•  headteachers will respond to the incentives created by the annual publication 
of summary performance measures – the precise way in which they do so will 
depend both on the specific PM being considered and on their individual 
motivation; 
                                                 
7 The context of Schofield’s study is the durability of bureaucracy amid ‘new public management’ 
reform in the National Health Service. The quote, however, applies equally well to managers of 
healthcare and education institutions. 7 
•  we expect headteachers both to try to improve performance and to employ 
strategies to game the system; 
•  the introduction of a value-added PM should mitigate the incentive for some 
of the dysfunctional behaviour caused by the focus on the %5A*-C indicator; 
•  the implicit financial incentive system, with money following the student, 
should mean that headteachers take parents’ views seriously. 
 
Before investigating these hypotheses, we briefly outline our methodology and 
provide some details of our sample. 
 
 
3 Methodology and sample 
 
The interviews reported in this paper were conducted as part of a wider project on the 
impact of the introduction of performance related pay for teachers and the impact of 
choice on educational outcomes. The sampling strategy and more details on the 
background to the larger project are outlined in Burgess and Croxson (2001). Here we 
report the results of just one section of the interview, which concentrated on eliciting 
headteachers’ views on the impact of league tables and on the introduction of value-
added performance measures. 
 
We carried out 22 semi-structured telephone interviews, which were recorded and 
subsequently transcribed, between December 2002 and May 2003
8. All but one of 
these interviews was with the school’s headteacher; on one occasion the deputy 
headteacher was interviewed. We interviewed by telephone, rather than face to face, 
since our sample is geographically dispersed and comprises senior people, likely to 
have to rearrange times at short notice. The topics covered in the interviews were 
unlikely to be sufficiently personal to heads to need the sensitivity afforded by face-
to-face interviews. 
 
We analysed transcripts for emergent themes, which we then checked against each 
answer to particular questions. Where appropriate, we categorised and tabulated the 
answers to specific questions. Our subjects were guaranteed anonymity, and the 
results have been reported accordingly. We have included quotations to illustrate the 
different types of views expressed.  
 
The schools in our sample comprised seven foundation, ten community and five 
voluntary aided schools. We interviewed three headteachers from grammar schools, 
none from secondary moderns, and 19 from comprehensives. 17 were co-educational, 
with two all girls schools and three all boys schools. There were three R oman 
Catholic and one Church of England school in our sample, and the rest were non-
denominational. The number of students in each school ranged from around 200 to 
approximately 2,000, and 11, i.e. half, had a sixth form. Our respondents also had a 
wide range of other characteristics: they ranged from 13.6% to 99.2% of students 
gaining at least 5 GCSEs at grade C or above; from 0.0% to 29.3% of students with 
special educational needs (without a statement); and from 1.4% to 51.4% of students 
                                                 
8 One interview was cut short before the questions relevant to the results reported here, hence we report 
the results of 21 respondents in this paper. Note that we did not find any systematic differences 
between the responses of those interviewed before the publication of the first secondary school value 
added performance measures, in January 2003, and those interviewed after that date.  8 
eligible for free school meals. Finally, there was also a fair geographical spread within 
our sample: from Cornwall to Sunderland, Dover to Liverpool, and including schools 





We asked our respondents questions on three related topics: (a) how they viewed the 
current league tables and their perceptions of other stakeholders’ views; (b) their 
responses to the key target indicator, %5A*-C; and (c) how they viewed the likely 
impact of the new value-added performance measure.  
 
(a) The current league tables 
 
We began by asking an open question: Do you know your school’s position in the 
league tables? We were interested in finding out with which schools headteachers 
compared their own performance, both in terms of national/local comparisons and in 
terms of school type, and also on which PMs they focussed. The majority were 
interested in their ranking relative to neighbouring schools, usually within the same 
Local Educational Authority (LEA), and within the diocese for one Roman Catholic 
comprehensive. Five headteachers said that they also compared their performance 
nationally, but only with schools of the same type. These five were the grammar 
schools and/or single sex schools from our sample, plus the smallest mixed 
comprehensive. As the headteacher of a girls grammar school said: 
 
“So I usually know where I am; I will rigorously buy all the papers and 
look and chart up results of my school against the top 20 girls’ grammar 
schools every year …. But I don’t look down the table. I look at what I 
would call a benchmarking group of the top 20 or so girls’ schools and the 
top 30 or so state selective schools, because I know it’s not fair to look 
outside that group because they’re not selective as w e are.”  (grammar, 
girls) 
 
When asked which PMs the headteachers focused on, 18 out of the 21 respondents 
identified the %5A*-C target indicator. Two of the grammar school heads said that 
this indicator wasn’t an issue for them as they would expect to achieve 100%. Each 
indicator was mentioned at least once: %5A*-G; %1A*-G; average point score; value-
added; and both authorised and unauthorised absences. Only one head took an interest 
in this last indicator, and she/he did so “only to see who’s telling the biggest lies”
9. 
 
So why the focus on %5A*-C? As one headteacher put it: 
 
“Although it’s the stupidest measure …. For one reason because it’s raw 
data, and the other reason is of course because it’s incredibly dependent on 
a small number of children at the …. threshold of performance. So it’s the 
silliest measure anybody ever came up with, but it’s totally engrained on 
the public psyche, isn’t it?” (comprehensive, mixed) 
                                                 
9 Fitz-Gibbon (1996) discusses the massaging of truancy rates in response to their inclusion in the 
league tables. 9 
 
Another head said: 
 
“It’s only important to me in so far as I think it’s very important to my 
students because it gets them into certain places [6
th form colleges] …. 
The world seems to have decided that five A to Cs is an indicator of 
something …. for our students it’s an important measure. They like the 
idea of coming from a school where you do well. There’s no doubt about 
that, and so do parents …. We’re now stuck with it still unless the 
government are going to do something really radical and do something 
with the exam system.” (comprehensive, mixed) 
 
Out of all the indicators published, %5A*-C is always the headline figure, hence 
headteachers have to know about it, even if they do not believe it is useful.  
 
What came across very clearly in the interviews was the wide range of indicators and 
measures employed within schools to monitor their own performance. Respondents 
discussed various ways in which they collected baseline data for students entering the 
school and how targets were subsequently set for each individual student in order to 
monitor individual progress. A wide range of value-added measures were discussed, 
including the ALIS, YELLIS and MidYIS systems administered by the CEM Centre 
at Durham University
10. Additionally, several respondents continually monitored 
current school performance relative to its own past performance. In effect, therefore, 
both change and gain PMs are increasingly, and routinely, being employed as internal 
performance management tools, while one  level PM  – %5A*-C  – continues to 
dominate the published league tables.  
 
We then asked: Who (else) do you think takes an interest in the league tables?
11 
This brought a mixed response. All but one headteacher said parents, some 
distinguishing between current and prospective parents. Governors and the LEA were 
the next two most common responses. Three heads mentioned the teaching staff and 
the impact of the school’s league table position on morale. There was a range of 
opinion on the importance these parties attached to the %5A*-C ranking position. For 
example, with regard to parents’ views, heads commented: 
 
“Parents h ave a very mixed view of them [the league tables], some of 
them take no notice at all, others pour over them. There’s an element of 
society that looks on them in the same way as they look at the premier 
league table in the Sunday paper, you know they’re like a sort of football 
competition.” (grammar, boys) 
 
“I think the parents’ view of the league tables in some cases has changed. I 
think that middle class parents are still quite hung up on the idea…very 
interested and very concerned, and feel that percentage point leagues have 
great significance. But I don’t think they’re as unsophisticated in their 
interpretation as they were five or ten years ago. I think they’re much 
more sophisticated now. And I think also they’re much more prepared and 
                                                 
10 http://www.cemcentre.org . 
11 Headteachers were able to give multiple responses to this question. 10 
willing to look at other aspects of the life of the school. They’re looking 
now at the position in league table as one factor only. They’re concerned 
about the pastoral care of the school, the way in which the schools treat 
children.” (comprehensive, mixed) 
 
There was also a range of views regarding the interest of LEAs in league table 
positions, which may reflect the practice of different LEAs: 
 
“The LEA are obsessed with league tables because they have their own 
league tables to perform in.” (comprehensive, mixed) 
 
“I think certainly people within local education authorities and even the 
government have now a better understanding of how schools are 
performing against the kinds of pupils that we have in our school. And I 
certainly think our local authority is less interested in the performance 
table position. They take a lot of trouble to get the kind of data which 
would enable them to see how the school has actually performed rather 
than through league tables.” (comprehensive, mixed) 
 
There was more consensus when we asked: Whose view is most important to you? 
14 respondents said parents
12; three said the school’s governors, two didn’t specify 
and one said that his/her own view of the school’s performance was the most 
important to him/her. The most common reason why parents’ views were held in such 
high regard by the respondents can be illustrated by the following response: 
 
“The parents. Because the school actually exists, as you know, it’s funded 
in the main by the number of kids who come through the door.” 
(comprehensive, mixed) 
 
Most of the headteachers we interviewed were very aware of the role they played in 
maintaining or increasing school rolls. Several spoke of the importance of marketing, 
including the importance of maintaining good links with local media in order that 
their school be reported favourably. The %5A*-C indicator was seen as central to 
marketing the school, although the respondents were well aware of the flaws of this 
indicator as a means of comparing the performance of different schools:  
 
“No I don’t think it’s fair at all …. I mean we’re a school as you know in a 
very deprived area with over 50% free school meals when two thirds of 
children come to our school with reading ages one year and many of them 
two years below the chronological reading ages, and we’re expected to get 
those children up to the level of the grammar schools, because we’re 
directly compared with them, in five years. That’s absolutely ridiculous.” 
(comprehensive, mixed) 
 
“So you’re not comparing like with like. And it’s really getting that 
message over that just as I said earlier, you know, a school could be doing 
a tremendous job with its kids but you know if you are working with 
                                                 
12 Two of these said parents and children, or the community in a wider sense. 11 
plywood there’s no way you’re going to make boats which require oak.” 
(comprehensive, mixed) 
 
In summary, the headteachers we interviewed employ a range of  change and gain 
PMs within the school to help improve student outcomes. They additionally find it 
necessary to focus on one published level PM, the percentage of students gaining at 
least five ‘good’ G CSE passes, largely because it is the primary focus of parental, 
media and, to a lesser extent, LEA attention. Out of this group, our respondents view 
parents as the most important stakeholder, reflecting their view of themselves as their 
school’s marketer.  
 
(b) Responses to league tables and the %5A*-C indicator 
 
We explored headteachers’ views about league tables in more detail, in order to gain 
insights into whether league tables in general, and target indicators such as %5A*-C 
in particular, created the kind of perverse incentives discussed in Section 2. We 
therefore asked heads: Have you ever targeted resources at particular areas in 
order to try and improve the school’s position in the league tables? If so, how?
 13 
 
Responses suggest that headteachers  have two (not mutually exclusive) types of 
strategy: strategies that target underachieving students generally, regardless of the 
existence of league tables; and strategies developed in response to league tables.  
 
Ten respondents discussed the strategies they had in place to target underachievement 
across the full ability distribution, regardless of their league table position. Strategies 
include the use of mentors, improving the information and communication technology 
(ICT) facilities available to students, introducing more vocational courses, and 
providing ‘catch up’ classes in literacy and numeracy. 
 
With respect to the second type of strategy, there was only one headteacher who 
discussed anything other than targeting students at the C/D border, which in itself is a 
reflection of the importance of the %5A*-C target indicator
14. As one respondent said: 
 
“By choosing five or more A to Cs and making such a big issue out of it, it’s 
no surprise that most schools put a huge amount of energy and resources into 
those students who are on the C/D borderline.” (comprehensive, mixed) 
 
Eight headteachers stated that they currently target resources at C/D borderline 
students in order to improve their league table position, a further two said they had 
done so in the past, and one said that s/he had tried, but failed, to avoid doing this. 
Conversely, two said they simply didn’t have any spare resources to target in such a 
way, and six stated that they deliberately didn’t follow such a strategy. Within this 
latter group, we got some very definite responses: 
 
“We deliberately don’t do that. I know many schools do, but we deliberately 
don’t …. We target resources to those that are under performing in general 
rather than on the C/D boundary only.” (comprehensive, mixed) 
                                                 
13 Headteachers were able to give multiple responses to this question. 
14 One respondent was additionally interested in G/U borderline pupils (those on borderline between 
the lowest pass grade and an unclassified or fail), although to a lesser extent. 12 
 
“And I haven’t jumped on the bandwagon of introducing vocational courses in 
order to colour the results.” (comprehensive, boys) 
 
This second respondent was referring to the practice of putting students in for 
GNVQs, which can be worth up to four GCSEs at grade C, in order that only one 
additional GCSE (at grade C or above) is required for a student to hit the target. The 
ICT GNVQ introduced and now sold by Thomas Telford school was mentioned by 
several respondents
15. As the respondent who said s/he tried to avoid such targeting 
explained: 
 
“And of course when I first heard about it [the four GCSE equivalent GNVQ 
in ICT organised by Thomas Telford school] I stupidly thought ‘Oh, it’s all 
right, the government are reviewing GNVQs, that’s a scam, they’re not going 
to allow it to carry on.’ But of course, I wasn’t cynical enough, I should have 
recognised that actually that particular scam suits the government, because it 
helps schools to meet the unrealistic targets they’re setting.” (comprehensive, 
mixed) 
 
The following quote illustrates this practice: 
 
“…we started last year, we introduced a GNVQ course which is a double 
award and we deliberately targeted that at the middle of the road pupils, those 
pupils who might get 4 A to C passes or who might get 6 A to C passes if we 
put them into this course.” (comprehensive, girls) 
 
In addition to entering students in general, and C/D borderline students in particular, 
for GNVQ exams, a wide range of strategies to target resources at C/D borderline 
students were discussed by our respondents. These included mentoring, Saturday 
revision classes and homework clubs, and more intensive monitoring of such 
students’ performance. The following quotes illustrate some specific examples of 
strategies to try and boost the key target indicator. These examples show that these 
targets have a substantial impact in schools: 
 
“Well, we give them the ‘Gee up Neddy, what are you going to do about this?’ 
sort of exhortation advice. … So they have Gee up Neddy 1 in September [of 
Year 11 (age 15/16)]. …[then in January, after mock exams have been 
marked] we bash them over the head with Gee up Neddy 2 in which we 
discuss their predicted grades, whether things are on course or not. And 
obviously at that point we get heavy with the kids who’ve got four C grades 
and tantalising numbers of Ds on their list.” (comprehensive, mixed) 
 
“A lot of strategies that we have been working on this term have been targeted 
at the C/D borderline student. … You know, the C/D borderline people do 
make a difference. We’ve also targeted for instance a group of Year 8 [age 
12/13] students. We were looking at this type of youngster, the C/D borderline 
youngster in Year 8, because obviously it’s not good enough just to target 
                                                 
15 According to the Times Educational Supplement, Thomas Telford school made £7 million pounds in 
two years selling its online ICT GNVQ courses (Mansell and Wright 2004). 13 
them in Year 11 … but it’s this type of youngster that is on this borderline that 
could go either way that … always makes in a small school such a difference 
to us. And what we’re doing with these ten youngsters in Year 8, we’ve 
considered them to be the cultural architects, the ones that can influence others 
in their peer groups. And so they’re fairly cool customers, you know well-
regarded by their peer group, as well as being in this little middle cohort, as 
identified by their CATs or by their subject teachers. And we’re putting in 
some extra self esteem raising workshops ….. it’s being closely monitored and 
then obviously continue to mentor them and then compare their progress with 
a group who haven’t been so supported, a group of another ten youngsters, you 
know as a control group.” (comprehensive, mixed) 
 
“… but identifying your youngsters who are going to get Ds, who with a bit of 
a push might get Cs. I refer to them as the fragiles. And the fragiles we put 
into a separate form. So I’ve got one form group of 20 youngsters who are all 
fragiles. And we make sure that the tutor there spends a lot of time mentoring 
these youngsters and we put lots of time and effort into them. Because … 
there’s only 100 or so children in the year group, so each child is worth a 
percent. So if I get those 20 through along with my sort of 30 that were 
predicted to anyway, that would be very nice, thank you.” (comprehensive, 
mixed) 
 
The wider potential impact of targeting resources at the C/D borderline student was 
recognised by this last respondent. When we asked him/her whether his/hers was a 
successful strategy to get these borderline students from D to C, s/he replied: 
 
“It is successful; as an educationalist I’m not entirely happy with it because 
I’m still thinking we’re putting all these extra resources in these youngsters to 
keep A to C figures up, but maybe there’s a youngster who’s going to get an E 
which is really good for them and who might end up getting an F because 
we’re not spending as much time with them. … The bright kids still prosper 
…. I don’t think they miss out at all. But I think the lower ability ones 
potentially do.” (comprehensive mixed) 
 
Headteachers are engaged in activities aimed at boosting the performance of students 
that have been identified as underachieving. While this is partly going on 
independently of the publication of the league tables, the centrality of the %5A*-C 
indicator seems to dictate what is perceived as ‘underachieving’, leading to a focus on 
those students on the C/D border. Such a focus may create a conflict between the role 
of the headteacher as an educationalist (serving the interests of all students) and 
his/her role as the marketer of the school. 
 
So, headteachers recognise the flaws in the current key PM, and react to it in ways 
that may not be welfare enhancing. The next section discusses the extent to which this 
might be alleviated by the publication of the new value-added performance measures. 
 
(c) The impact of value-added performance measures 
 
As we discussed above, many schools already use variations of value-added measures 
internally as a performance management tool to measure individual student progress. 14 
We asked: Do you think that the new [DfES] value-added indicators give a more 
accurate reflection of school performance than PMs that measure raw outcomes? 
 
18 respondents answered this question. Out of these, only two were definitively 
against value-added PMs, and three were not sure whether they would be more 
accurate. Seven headteachers were positive about their introduction, while the 
remaining six were generally in favour of the use of value-added PMs in theory, but 
had reservations about the particular form currently being published in the DfES 
league tables and/or the methodology underlying its calculation
16.  
 
Their reservations included whether one PM should measure value-added from age 11 
to age 16 (KS2-KS4) or, as is currently the case, whether there should be two 
measures: one covering ages 11 to 14 (KS2-KS3); and one covering ages 14 to 16 
(KS3-KS4). The range of views expressed on this issue is reflected in the following 
comments: 
 
“So I’m not really bothered whether it’s Key Stage 2 to Key Stage 4, or Key 
Stage 3 to Key Stage 4, or 2 to 3. I think what I am more interested in is: are 
those tests a fair indicator of what a child has learnt and are they measuring the 
things that we think are important to measure.” (comprehensive, mixed). 
 
“I think that [publishing KS2-KS3 and KS3-KS4] is really rather stupid 
because of course they’ve been able to do that for the last two years where 
we’ve got Key Stage 2 to GCSE value-added, and we’ve plotted that in school. 
That looks very healthy for us. I like that one.” (grammar, girls). 
 
“… Key Stage 2 is no reflection whatsoever of the children’s ability. ….. 
Because you coach them. I mean you can’t blame them [primary schools] for 
doing it because they have league tables as well. I certainly think perhaps Key 
Stage 3 to 4. Because we’ve got control of that, it’s all in our school, it’s all 
with our kids. So I think that’s probably fairer” (comprehensive, mixed). 
 
Other aspects of the current methodology that were questioned by our respondents 
included the fact that the government doesn’t publish uncertainty (or confidence) 
intervals for each school’s value-added PMs, which makes it difficult to judge the 
extent to which differences between scores are significant; the imposition of the cap at 
a student’s eight best GCSEs; and the oversimplification involved with using only 
one, school average PM, since it doesn’t take account of differences in subject 
difficulty
17. One headteacher of an all boys comprehensive school would also prefer 
gender specific value-added PMs, as “we honestly believe there is a lowering in the 
rate of maturity of boys once they’re in the second phase” and hence that whole 
cohort value-added measures don’t accurately reflect the performance of single sex 
boys schools. Given these caveats and reservations, however, there was a general 
consensus amongst our respondents that the move towards using value-added PMs as 
the basis for measuring and comparing school performance was, in principle, a 
positive step forward: 
                                                 
16 Five of these six were interviewed after the 2002 league tables were published (i.e. after January 
2003). Out of the seven who were most positive, three were interviewed after publication and four prior 
to the league tables being released. 
17 Propper and Wilson (2003) discuss all these points in more detail. 15 
 
“But having said all that, I think the value-added has to be enormously better 
than raw results.” (comprehensive, mixed) 
 
“The idea is an excellent one and I’m pleased they’re doing it and that’s really 
how everyone should be judged. How it’s going to work out in practice, I 
reserve judgement.” (comprehensive, mixed) 
 
“I’d be happier to be measured against value-added than I would against some 
other things, do you know what I mean?” (comprehensive, mixed) 
 
We then asked: Do you expect the publication of the new value-added indicators 
to have an impact on you as headteacher? Six respondents said it would have an 
impact, primarily because it would more accurately reflect their school’s performance. 
Six were not sure or wanted to reserve judgement. Eight said that the publication of 
value-added PMs would not have an impact on them as headteachers. A range of 
reasons why not were expressed:  
 
“…at the moment I don’t understand or trust it.” (comprehensive, mixed) 
 
“It [the publication of VA] won’t affect me in the sense that we already spend 
a huge amount of time analysing that. It will only affect me if I’m not able to 
demonstrate that we’re making better progress than other schools round 
about.” (comprehensive, mixed) 
 
“… if it comes out as I expect, it will make me quite happy and proud. You 
know be able to put my nose in the air, hopefully against some of those 
schools who’ve thought they were superior to us just because they have a 
better intake all the time.” (comprehensive, mixed) 
 
There was more consensus when we asked: Do you think the publication of value-
added information would have an impact on other parties in the education 
system? Several respondents suggested that school governors and LEAs would be 
interested, but that there was already a lot of value-added information being shared 
between these parties and the school via individual school performance management 
systems and the annual PANDA returns
18. Several also made the same point in 
relation to their teaching staff. One headteacher thought that it would impact on 
teachers by giving them a more realistic idea of their own performance. Eighteen 
respondents discussed whether or not the value-added PMs would have an impact on 
parents. Of these, only one thought parents definitely wanted the new performance 
measures; one said that it depended on how they were marketed; and one did not 
know if or how parents would react. One talked of the need for schools to engage in a 
learning process with parents to show them what value-added scores mean. Two noted 
that different parents would react in different ways. As one headteacher put it: 
 
“…. some parents are very involved and follow these things really carefully. 
Others leave them [their children] at the gate and say ‘you look after them’. So 
                                                 
18 PANDA returns are Ofsted’s Performance and Assessment Reports, made available annually to all 
schools as part of the Autumn Package. See http://www.teachernet.gov/management/tools/panda for 
more information. 16 
there’s going to be a range of responses. But on balance I think parents will be 
pleased to see progress.” (comprehensive, mixed) 
 
Over half the respondents to this question, however, did not think parents would 
engage with the new value-added performance measures, at least in the short to 
medium term. Two main reasons emerged for this. First, the complexity of these 
value-added PMs and the subsequent lack of understanding by the majority of parents. 
Second, the fact that this was yet another PM to add to the wide range of data already 
published on different aspects of school performance, and that, out of these, the 
%5A*-C target indicator was already engrained on the public psyche. The following 
quotes illustrate these points: 
 
“What concern I have is that parents might get confused. But as parents are 
becoming more sophisticated looking at performance information I really 
don’t know.” (comprehensive, mixed) 
 
“I don’t think the public understand where these [value-added] indices come 
from … and actually now I think people are quite blasé about the league 
tables. I think they’ve been satiated with them. And the more complicated that 
the government makes the statistics, the more it will confuse and put off the 
parents from even bothering to look because they’re old hat.” (comprehensive, 
mixed) 
 
“I think the problem is that the population as a whole and newspapers and the 
media and everyone else will still go on the raw results.” (comprehensive, 
mixed) 
 
“I think it’s so difficult for people. You know they’re so wedded to the idea of 
good school equals good results …. I think they think value-added is just a 
more complicated way of coming up with the same thing. And so really it’s 
going to be a very long time if ever before they’re taken seriously by people 
out there in the media and so on. I just don’t think they understand them.” 
(comprehensive, girls) 
 
So while our respondents were generally – if cautiously – positive about the move 
towards value-added PMs as the  basis for measuring and comparing school 
performance, they expressed doubts that their introduction would have a substantial 
impact on behaviour. There seem to be two reasons for this. First, different types of 
value-added information are already used within the school and shared with 
stakeholders such as school governors and the LEA. Second, the new value-added 
PMs are unlikely to have an impact on parents, given their perceived complexity and 






The production of education involves multiple stakeholders and complex objectives, 
which a performance management system will only partially capture. There is 
therefore scope for undesired as well as desired responses. Headteachers play a central 17 
role in the link between measurement of and improvement in school (and hence 
student) performance. How they respond in practice depends both on the incentives 
created by the particular performance management scheme employed, and on their 
individual motivation. In this paper we analyse 21 interviews with headteachers to 
investigate their views about, and strategies in response to, the publication of specific 
PMs used in the English secondary education sector. 
 
Our findings suggest that headteachers are generally aware of their school’s position 
in league tables, in particular with regard to the %5A*-C target indicator. While 
conscious of this PM’s flaws as a measurement tool, the fact that it is the ‘headline 
figure’ used by other stakeholders means that they have to pay some attention to 
improving their school’s performance relative to it. This may involve strategies to 
‘game’ the indicator, often by re-allocating resources to those students targeted at the 
C/D borderline. While all respondents were aware of this strategy, not all followed it. 
The introduction of a value-added PM was generally, if cautiously, welcomed. The 
majority of respondents did not expect it to change their behaviour, however, given 
that it  is perceived as a complex addition to an already crowded league table. 
Throughout the interviews it was parents who emerged as being the most important 
stakeholder for headteachers, who believed that parents’ behaviour was unlikely to be 
affected by the publication of value-added PMs, at least in the short term. 
 
We can therefore accept all but one of the hypotheses listed in Section 2. 
Headteachers do respond to the incentives created by the league tables, and we find 
evidence both of genuine effort to improve student performance and of some gaming 
of the system. Parents’ views are taken particularly seriously by headteachers. The 
introduction of the value-added PM does not, however, seem likely to reduce the 
incentive for some of the dysfunctional behaviour caused by the focus on %5A*-C. 
The reasons for this seem to be particular to the performance management system 
employed in the English education sector, rather than to be related to the use of value-
added as a measurement tool per se. Indeed, the use of value-added as an internal 
performance management tool  within schools  was widespread amongst our 
respondents. 
 
The design of the performance management system is crucial here: it determines the 
balance between measured and unmeasured performance, between e xtrinsic and 
intrinsic reward. The intended purpose for each PM should determine both its form 
and the decision whether or not to publicly disclose the resulting information. Value-
added measures are already widely used by schools as internal performance 
management tools. Given that value-added is a more accurate basis for measuring and 
comparing school performance, and so should be incorporated in the published league 
tables, our analysis has the following policy implications. 
 
The specific form of the value-added PM needs to be considered, in particular with 
regard to its applicability to specific stakeholder(s) (Propper and Wilson 2003). The 
current value-added PMs provide measures of school performance which do not 
distinguish between the effects of resource levels, of teachers, or of peer groups. The 
indicators do not, therefore, accurately measure one important government objective: 
raising standards for a given resource base. However, they do provide an indication of 
the impact of the whole package, something of direct interest to parents when 
choosing schools. The importance our respondents placed on parents as stakeholders 18 
suggests that such a value-added PM has the potential to facilitate an effective implicit 
financial incentive scheme in the education quasi-market, in which money follows 
students. In order for this to be realised, however, parents need to be informed. There 
hence needs to be a shift in focus, away from the %5A*-C indicator and towards 
value-added performance measures. This is likely to require both simplification of the 
existing English secondary school performance tables and a process of learning for 
parents regarding how to interpret the results. Consultation with headteachers 
regarding these changes may further help to ensure that provider incentives and 
stakeholder objectives are better aligned. In this way, the use of value-added PMs may 
improve both what gets measured and what gets done in secondary schools. 19 
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